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REMEMBERING MELVILLE NIMMER: SOME CAUTIONARY 
NOTES ON COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
William Van Alstyne• 
INTRODUCfiON AND PART I 
The First Amendment law of commercial speech is currently in con, 
fusion. It suffers in at least two ways. First, there is no clear agreement 
what "commercial speech" is, i.e., what speech is within the subset of 
speech called commercial speech, as distinct from what is outside that 
subset. But second, there is also no clear agreement as to why this matters, 
i.e., how much difference it makes for First Amendment purposes to say that 
something is or is not (or is not merely) commercial speech. 
To be sure, the Supreme Court is generally of the view-and has been 
for twenty years-that commercial speech is not some kind of orphan left 
out in the cold under the First Amendment. It went out of its way to say 
so, dispelling strong earlier impressions to the contrary, in 1976: 
Some fragment of hope for the continuing validity of a "commercial 
speech" exception [to the First Amendment] might have persisted 
[notwithstanding recent decisions of the Court because each could 
be explained whether one thought there was such an exception or 
not] .... 
Here, in contrast, the question whether there is a First Amend, 
ment exception for "commercial speech" is squarely hefore us. Our 
pharmacist [wishes merely to advertise prescription drug prices, 
nothing more. He] does not wish to editorialize on any subject, 
cultural, philosophical, or political. He does not wish to report any 
particularly newsworthy fact, or to make generalized observations 
even about commercial matters. The "idea" he wishes to communi, 
cate is simply this: "I will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y 
·• William and Thomas Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University. This Article is adapted 
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price." Our question, then, is whether this communication is wholly 
outside the protection of the First Amendment . 
. . . Our answer is that it is not.1 
This decision, Virginia Phamutcy, was far from trivial-if only because of 
what the opposite decision would have meant. Specifically, the opposite 
decision would have meant that no matter what the effect of a particular 
regulation (limiting how, when, where, or in what form any such communi, 
cation would be permitted to appear), if it were merely a regulation of 
commercial speech, any attempt to challenge it on First Amendment 
grounds (and not merely on the basis of the Commerce Clause,2 the Due 
Process Clause,3 or the Equal Protection Clause4) would be subject at once 
to demurrer. The opposite decision, that is, would have meant that in 
respect to "purely commercial speech," no claim may arise under the First 
Amendment at all. It is assuredly just this proposition that is denied and 
laid firmly to rest in the Virginia Phamutcy case. 5 
1. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 760-62 (1976); see also id. at 776 ("Today the Court ends the anomalous situation created by 
Chrestensen and holds that a communication which does no more than propose a commercial 
transaction is not wholly outside the protection of the First Amendment." (Stewart, J., con· 
curring) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
2. I.e., as an "unreasonable" or "discriminatory" state-imposed burden on interstate com· 
merce invalid under the negative voice of the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington 
State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977). 
3. I.e., as depriving an entrepreneur of his "liberty" (to pursue a lawful occupation) or 
"property" (in respect to the disposition of goods and services) without sufficient justification (i.e., 
without "substantive due process"). See also infra note 5. 
4. I.e., as arbitrarily forbidding one class of entrepreneurs from doing what others meaning· 
fully indistinguishable from them are permitted to do. 
5. Justice Rehnquist dissented alone in Virginia Pharmacy, observing that the Court had 
previously treated regulation of commercial advertising practices as subject only to minimum 
rationality substantive economic due process review. He protested that the decision in this case 
"extends the protection of [the First Amendment) to purely commercial endeavors which its most 
vigorous champions on this Court had thought to be beyond its pale." 425 U.S. at 781. He 
doubtless had in mind Justices Douglas and Black. See infra note 25. For a supportive review of 
Justice Rehnquist's position, see Thomas H. Jackson & John C. Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: 
Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 25 (1979). But see Steven 
Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First 
Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212 (1983). In fact, however, the Court had previously distin· 
guished between "commercial speech" (advertising, sales solicitations) for commercial goods and 
services not protected by the First Amendment (e.g., pots and pans) and commercial speech for 
those protected by the First Amendment (e.g., books, newspapers, magazines). See, e.g., Breard v. 
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951) ("We agree that the fact that periodicals are sold does not 
put them beyond the protection of the First Amendment." (emphasis added)). 
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Although the Court has put that matter to rest, 6 disagreement 
remains rife, even these twenty years later. And it is rife on both of the 
points we have just noted: What is "commercial" speech,7 and, as to all 
that is concededly included within merely commercial speech, what resid~ 
ual constitutional difference does it make? More specifically still, how, if at 
all, may commercial speech be treated differently, or less favorably, than 
other speech (namely, varieties of "noncommercial" speech)? That com~ 
mercial speech, whatever it is, is "within" the First Amendment, may not 
tell us very much, if the conclusion yields little by way of protection that 
would otherwise be lacking had it remained fenced outside.8 
6. Though not entirely. See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 
U.S. 328, 346 (1986) (suggesting that insofar as a product or service could be banned by a legis· 
lature without successful complaint under the Due Process Clause, the legislature may take the 
lesser measure of tolerating legal traffic in the product or service but discouraging consumer inter· 
est by forbidding those engaged in it from advertising its lawful availability). For further discus· 
sion of Posadas, see infra note 8. 
7. Is it "any speech engaged in primarily for economic ends" (e.g., to earn a fee or to make 
a profit)? Evidently not. See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482 (1989) ("Some of our 
most valued forms of fully protected speech are uttered for a profit."); see also United States v. 
National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995) (as applied to those under civil 
service grade GS-16, an act of Congress forbidding federal employees to accept compensation for 
speeches, books, or articles, whether or not related to their regular work in government, held 
void on First Amendment grounds); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (paid advertisement 
for commercial out-of-state abortion service held protected, overruling state court's distinction 
between carrying the information as a news feature (which the state court acknowledged would 
be fully protected) and carrying it for hire, i.e., as a mere third-party ad). But see Bolger v. 
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (pamphlets sent through the mail promoting the 
sender's brand of prophylactics held to be "commercial speech," whether or not they also provide 
more general information on birth control and venereal disease); New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding a newspaper protected by the First Amendment from libel 
action for content appearing in a paid advertisement soliciting contributions to the same extent 
as any standard news story or editorial the newspaper might have run); see also Fox, 492 U.S. at 
482 (distinguishing a fee-charging attorney, or a fee-charging tutor, invited to meet with students 
in their dormitory, from a Tupperware representative likewise invited, identifying only the latter 
as a "commercial" speaker because he, but not the attorney or tutor, would be "propos[ing] a 
commercial transaction, which is what defines commercial speech"). For a close, critical review 
of the Court's various definitions, see Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commer· 
cia! Speech?, 76 VA. L. REv. 627,638-48 (1990). 
8. See, e.g., Posadas, 478 U.S. at 346 (holding that insofar as a kind of business-
casinos-could be forbidden were the government inclined to do so (although it is not forbidden 
and, indeed, is currently entirely lawful to engage in, exactly in the manner the company wishing 
to advertise accurately represents), the government may take the "lesser" step of permitting it and 
simultaneously "reduc[e] ... demand through restrictions on advertising," to the very end of 
suppressing correct information about it, and to do so for the express purpose of minimizing pub· 
lic awareness of the service and the terms on which it is available to them). In short, Posadas 
suggests that "truth in advertising" is not a virtue the legislature need respect insofar as the adver· 
tising may stimulate demand for a product or service the state deems ill-advised for people to 
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Recently, however, we have been receiving very strong signals from 
the Supreme Court-or at least from some members of the Court-that 
commercial speech, even of a most ordinary sort according to a lay person's 
understanding, is more than merely within the First Amendment. We have 
been receiving strong signals that perhaps it is sometimes even fully as much 
within the Amendment as any other kind of speech may be-including 
speech on political affairs. 
Indeed, this somewhat startling latter possibility was obliquely fore~ 
shadowed even in the seminal case of Virginia Pharmacy by Justice 
Blackmun. Justice Blackmun observed the following when he presumed to 
compare the general public's interest in information about various commer~ 
cial products and services with its interest in public issues, in candidates for 
office, in political parties, or in matters of war or of peace: 
As to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commer~ 
cial information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, 
than IUs interest in the clay's most urgent political debate. 9 
And if that is so, and no doubt it truly often is,10 then the hint appears to 
want. And insofar as the state does not want them to want it (because it regards it, and their 
desire for it, as ill-advised), the state may forbid even truthful advertising of that good or service. 
On this rationale, advertisements for automobiles giving less than a certain minimum miles per 
gallon of fuel could be flatly prohibited, though presumably, news stories featuring such cars could 
not be prohibited, nor could their inclusion in assessments by Consumer Reports or Road & Track 
be forbidden, assuming such publications received no fee from manufacturers or distributors. 
Likewise, advertisements for motorcycles of any kind might similarly be banned, assuming the 
state could outlaw them outright (though it neither has done so nor is there any likelihood that 
such legislation could in fact pass). Advertisement of debt adjustment services provided by non· 
lawyers could, in principle, similarly be forbidden, since it would not be unconstitutional to 
outlaw such services. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); see Philip B. Kurland, 
Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Company: "'Twas Strange, 'Twas Passing Strange; 'Twas Pitiful, 
'Twas Wondrous Pitiful, • 1986 SUP. cr. REv. 1, 12-13. For the most recent critical review of the 
Posadas doctrine, see Brooks R. Fudenberg, Unconstitutional Conditions and Greater Powers: A 
Separability Approach, 43 UCLA L. REv. 371 (1995). See also id. at 386 n.76 (collecting previous 
reviews). For the most recent developments, see 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 
1495 (1996). 
9. Virginia PhaTTr~~Zcy, 425 U.S. at 763 (emphasis added). 
10. After all, as the National Enquirer likes to observe, "Inquiring Minds Want to Know." 
They "want to know" about the kind of creme rinse Cyndi Lauper uses as much as, perhaps even 
more than, they want to know whether the CIA may have helped bring down the government in 
South Vietnam. Cf. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 523, 527: 
mhe most influential free-speech theorists of the eighteenth century-those who drafted 
the First Amendment and their mentors-placed great emphasis on the role free expres· 
sion can play in guarding against breaches of trust by public officials. Indeed, if one had 
to identify the single value that was uppermost in the minds of the persons who drafted 
and ratified the First Amendment, this checking value would be the most likely candi· 
date. 
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be a strong one that, given this equal (or even greater) intensity of interest, 
perhaps the "free flow of commercial information" is itself to be deemed 
equally important for First Amendment purposes as the "free flow" of "the 
day's most urgent political debate." lf this is so, it is assuredly a matter of 
consequence indeed. It suggests that the state must treat with equal respect 
commercial and noncommercial speech. And evidently, that is what 
Justice Blackmun had in mind. 11 
But if the latitude one may have for advertising, say, Carter's Little 
Pills12 is to be the same for First Amendment purposes as the latitude one 
may have for advertising one's views on Proposition X, 13 then, in order to 
maintain a level playing field, it is obvious enough that one of two things 
must also happen the instant one so declares. Either the freedom to adver, 
tise Carter's Little Pills must be treated as equally important as the freedom 
to advertise Proposition X (Justice Blackmun's view14), or the freedom to 
advertise Proposition X must be treated as equally inconsequential as the 
freedom merely to advertise Carter's Little Pills, a possibility others noted 
could well happen were Justice Blackmun's view equating the two to pre, 
Id.; Harry Kalven,Jr., If This Be Asymmetry, Make the Most oflt!, CENTER MAG., May/june 1973, 
at 36; Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First 
Amendment, • 1964 SUP. Cr. REv. 191; Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 
STAN. L. REv. 1249 (1995). 
· 11. See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 777-78 (1993) (Blackmun, J., concurring) 
("I again disengage myself from any part [of the Court's opinion], or inference therefrom, that 
commercial speech that is free from fraud or duress or the advocacy of unlawful activity is entitled 
to only an 'intermediate standard' [of protection, rather than the full measure of protection that 
noncommercial speech is accorded under the First Amendment]."). 
12. An uncontroversial example within the lay person's most ordinary understanding of 
"commercial speech." 
13. An example of a political "Proposition X" might be the forthcoming referendum propO' 
sition on the California 1996 ballot which would, if adopted, forbid the state to classify persons 
by race for allocating opportunities under law by race (unless required to do so by federal law 
under threat of forfeiting federal assistance grants). 
14. And ostensibly the view of Judge Alex Kozinski as well. See Kozinski & Banner, supra 
note 7, at 627; see also Waits v. FritO'Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 
U.S. 1080 (1993); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding 
unauthorized parody of identifiable celebrity to promote a commercial product not protected from 
a common law misappropriation of likeness claim, though no such action (whether for misapprO' . 
priation, libel, or intentional infliction of emotional distress) would survive a First Amendment 
defense of protected political parody not incidental to a mere promotional cultivation of con· 
sumer sales of the advertiser's products), reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir.) (en bane) (Kozinski, 
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993); cf. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 
46 (1988) (satire of religious figure); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 
(1977) (unauthorized broadcast of "human cannonball" stunt). For a strong response to the 
Kozinski dissent in White, see J. Thomas McCarthy, The Spring 1995 Horace S. Manges Lecture-
The Human Persona as Commercial Property: The Right of Publicity, 19 COLUM.·VLA J.L. & ARTS 
129, 137-38 (1995). 
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vail. 15 One way or the other, however, it comes to the same thing in the 
end. The choice must be made, that is, either to "level up" commercial 
speech to the high plateau of core political speech or to "level down" poli~ 
tical speech to the low plateau of commercial speech, or perhaps to have 
them meet somewhere in between. If the one sort of speech is to be 
acknowledged as "as much within" or "as well within" the First Amendment 
as the other, these are the evident choices to be made-to unify the stan~ 
dards, and so have them generally treated indistinguishably. And that is a most 
disconcerting, if also a most provocative, thought. 
PART II 
Disconcerting or not, the idea of constitutionally mandating Uke treat~ 
ment of commercial and noncommercial speech is an idea whose time has 
evidently arrived, at least in part. For in one of the most provocative 
recent Supreme Court commercial speech cases, Justice Stevens declared for 
a majority of the Court that there are circumstances-perhaps a very large 
number-when "commercial" and "noncommercial" speech may not be 
treated differently by the state. 16 indeed, this would be true, Justice 
Stevens suggested, in any case where the character of the interest thought 
sufficient to justify some kind of restriction on the one kind of speech is 
indistinguishably present in the manifestation of the other kind as well. 
However the state chooses to treat them, whenever this is so, he suggested, 
the state must treat them the same-whether for better or (and here's the 
possible downside) for worse. 
If, for example, the proliferation of news racks at street comers in a 
municipality's central city has reached a nuisance level city council mem~ 
hers regard as worthy of their attention, in Justice Steven's view the muni~ 
cipality is not at all helpless to take strong regulatory measures. Indeed, 
there are any number of measures it may pursue. But, insofar as it takes any 
such measures, the new suggestion holds, such measures must fall on the 
15. Justice Powell expressly noted this possibility in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 
U.S. 447, 456 (1978) ("To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and non· 
commercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the 
Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech."). See also Florida Bar v. Went 
forlt, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2375 (1995) (reiterating Justice Powell's dictum); Board of Trustees 
v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 481 (1989) (same); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 591 (1980) ("The test adopted by the Court ... elevates the protection 
accorded commercial speech •.. to a level that is virtually indistinguishable from that of non· 
commercial speech. I think the Court in so doing has effectively accomplished the 'devitaliza-
tion' of the First Amendment that it counseled against in Ohralik." (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). 
16. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993). 
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"commercial" and "noncommercial" news racks alike-at kast in all cases 
where the nuisance characteristics are shared equaUy. 
What might this mean? According to this view, banning news racks 
as a mode of distributing "commercial" material (e.g., The Cincinnati Real 
Estate Advertiser17), while leaving untouched the more numerous news 
racks of other publications (e.g., The Cincinnati Inquirer, The New York 
Times, The Wall Street journal, The Gay,Lesbian News18), becomes "an im, 
permissible means of responding to the city's admittedly legitimate inter, 
ests, "19 when there is nothing to distinguish the one kind of news rack 
from the other kind of news rack. lf it is perfectly plain that each news 
rack, considered without reference to the material it contains, is "equaUy at 
fault" in contributing to the problem of street comer congestion, then they 
must be regulated equally.20 
According to this view, any differential regulation of "commercial" 
from "noncommercial" material must find its rationale in something about 
the "commercial" material not equivalently present in the noncommercial 
material, for otherwise the difference in treatment invites invalidation as an 
impermissible kind of "content discrimination. "21 So Justice Stevens 
declared expressly in the Discovery Network case, offering the following 
clinching critique: 
In sum, the city's newsrack policy is [not] content--neutral • ... Thus, 
regardless of whether or not it leaves open ample alternative channels of 
[commercial advertising), it cannot be justified as a legitimate time, 
place, or manner restriction on protected speech.22 
17. A "newspaper" containing only ordinary advertisements for real estate sales and no 
other features, stories, or opinion. See Disco11ery Network, 507 U.S. at 424 ("[F]or the purpose of 
deciding this case, we assume that all of the speech barred from [being distributed by means of 
stationary boxes put out on] Cincinnati's sidewalks is what we have labeled 'core' commercial 
speech .... "). 
18. In other words, newspapers containing features other than mere real es~ate ads. 
19. Disco11ery Network, 507 U.S. at 424 (emphasis added). 
20. ld. at 426 (emphasis added). 
21. Cf. Justice Douglas in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 
(1949): "It is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or 
none at all." This sentence is given meaning and emphasis by the sentence preceding it in the 
Douglas opinion, namely: 'Tnhe fact that New York City sees fit to eliminate from traffic this 
kind of distraction but does not touch what may be even greater ones in a different category ... 
is immaterial." ld. Despite Justice Douglas's view, although it may not be a requirement of equal 
protection "that all evils of the same genus he eradicated or none at all," the majority opinion in 
Disco11ery Network suggests it may well become a requirement of the First Amendment instead. 
22. Disco11ery Network, 507 U.S. at 430 (emphasis added). Ordinarily, however, commercial 
speech is presumed to be sufficiently "hardy" that entrepreneurs will seek out any existing reason· 
ably cost-efficient alternative means of conveying ordinary sales promotional messages. Entre· 
preneurs, it is assumed, have a profit-seeking (and profit-catching) interest in pursuing these 
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And so, if presence of news racks on its streets creates a problem 
thought worthy of some kind of "news rack policy," yet news racks contain· 
ing stacks of merely commercial advertising papers contribute to that prob· 
lem no more (or, indeed, in total number, in the actual case far less) than 
those containing other kinds of papers, the city cannot require that they be 
removed. This is so Stevens says, "even if we assume, arguendo, that the 
city might entirely prohibit the use of news racks on public property"23 
(which, if reduced to this choice, the city may well decide to do2"). More· 
over, whatever the rationing device used by the city in its newsrack policy, 
it allegedly may not "discriminate" against commercial vis·a·vis ordinary 
alternative media, such that they do not need the kind of subsidy that the First Amendment 
furnishes to others using leaflets (and other "public forum" devices) to signal attention to social 
grievance or causes they seek to have redressed. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,772 n.24 (1976) ("[C]ommercial speech 
may be more durable than other kinds. Since advertising is the sine qua non of commercial prof· 
its, there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and foregone entirely."). 
23. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 427-28. And note the point well. The threat is not an 
empty one. Justice Stevens had already indicated his own view that freedom of the press and of 
speech offer no protection from a city eliminating aU news racks from public locations. See City 
of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 780-81 (1988) {White, J., dissenting, 
joined by Stevens and O'Connor, JJ.). Justices Rehnquist and Thomas agree with that view as 
well. See Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 438 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined by White and 
Thomas, JJ.). More generally, one may note in passing (albeit with regret) that Justice Stevens 
has been less than acutely supportive of a strong version of the First Amendment against imposi· 
tions of time, place, and manner restrictions by the state, even on "fully protected" speech. See, 
e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (voting to sustain censorship of 
high school newspaper); City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (voting to 
sustain total ban on any public property postings, see infra note 44); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 
U.S. 726 (1978) (voting to sustain FCC daytime ban on "indecent" broadcasting applied to radio 
broadcast of George Carlin's parody, "Filthy Words"); see also Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. 
FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994) (voting to sustain congressionally-imposed demands that cable 
television companies subsidize local over-the-air companies by providing free transmission on no 
fewer than one-third of their channels, whether or not this displaces more distant program origi· 
nators whose program content may not otherwise be available at all); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 
505 U.S. 377 (1992) (dicta approving subject-specific "hate speech" ordinances); United States v. 
Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (voting to sustain criminal 
conviction in flag-burning political demonstration). · 
24. Thus the city is itself pressed by the Court's new doctrine toward the harsh option of 
"leveling down" highly protected speech (that of the bona fide press, independent journals and 
publications, and underground and idiosyncratic newspapers that may depend more crucially on 
distribution from boxes located on convenient street comers). The dissent in Discovery Network 
makes the point forcefully. See 507 U.S. at 445 ("Today's decision ... places the city in the 
position of having to decide between restricting more speech-fully protected speech-and allow· 
ing the proliferation of newsracks on its street comers to continue unabated. It scarcely seems 
logical that the First Amendment compels such a result."). It not only "scarcely seems logical," 
but scarcely seems credible (i.e, plausible). 
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newpapers, at least when, as here, the common mode for distributing the 
former contributes no more to the common problem than the latter (and 
indeed may contribute far less).25 
PART III 
If we combine Justice Blackmun's views since 197626 with those of 
Justice Stevens as recently reflected in Discovery Network, we seem to arrive 
at a rather strange place. 27 For if this reasoning is right, even one who 
wants to distribute handbills calling attention to some rally or some speech 
the public is invited to attend,28 whether by Colin Powell or Jesse Jackson 
(or Jesse Helms), may have just as much right to do so as another who wants 
to distribute handbills calling attention to a sale the public is invited to 
avail itself of at Macy's, but no more of a right than the latter. And indeed, 
to the extent that the distribution of handbills is allowed in the first 
instance, and the distribution of handbills for a Macy's sale would be no 
more of a nuisance (perhaps even far less of nuisance29), then even if 
neither need be allowed, if the former is permitted, the latter must appar, 
25. For a contrast, see the dissent in Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 649 (1951). The 
majority in Breard had voted to sustain a city ordinance prohibiting uninvited solicitors from 
calling on residents, as applied to magazine sales personnel just as much as to "Fuller Brush" 
salesmen or salesmen of other goods. It also had distinguished Martin v. City of Struthers, 
319 U.S. 141 (1943) (holding such an ordinance invalid as applied to Jehovah's Witnesses). 
Justices Black and Douglas dissented in Breard, concluding that even door·tMoor solicitations for 
magazine subscriptions were sufficiently central to the First Amendment that the restriction, 
otherwise valid, could not be applied to them. That it would be valid as applied to ordinary 
commercial sales, on the other hand, they had no doubt at all. See 341 U.S. at 650 n.• (Black, 
J., dissenting) ("Of course I believe that the present ordinance could constitutionally be applied 
to a 'merchant' who goes from door to door 'selling pots.'"). 
26. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (insisting on equal First Amendment treat· 
ment of commercial and noncommercial speech, where considerations of fraud, duress, or illegal 
advocacy are not involved); Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 431 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
2 7. Unless there is something wrong with our reasoning, which I hope shortly to show there 
is. Melville Nimmer would assuredly be very quick to agree. See infra note 31. 
28. Whether only on payment of an admission fee, or for free, we will not now stop to say. 
Cf. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 154, 155 n.3 (1939) (handbills calling attention to "a 
meeting to be held under the auspices of 'Friends Lincoln Brigade' at which speakers would dis-
cuss the war in Spain," with notice of $.25 and $.50 "admission j. 
29. lf, as Justice Blackmun suggests, consumers may frequently value information about a 
sale at Macy's more than they may value information as to when and where Jesse Jackson will be 
speaking, they may be far more inclined to keep the leaflet on the Macy's sale, even while drop-
ping the leaflet about the Jackson speech into the street (so the problem of litter from leaflets is 
more substantially a problem of political leaflets than of commercial leaflets). 
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ently be permitted as well.30 Moreover, whatever the measure taken to 
bring the felt nuisance under more manageable control, it must not draw 
distinctions on allegedly facile suppositions that information of sales at 
Macy's is of any "lower value" to the public than information on when and 
where Colin Powell, Jesse Jackson, or Jesse Helms may be heard. Why? 
Evidently, again, it is just because such allegedly facile assumptions (of 
"lower value") are not to be deemed to be consistent with the First Amend, 
ment.31 
Adhering to this new test, a federal district court recently held uncon-
stitutional an act of Congress barring the use of automati~dialing,and, 
announcing devices (ADADs32) by telemarketers.33 It did so on the 
ground that there was no evidence that the intrusion into one's privacy by 
30. See People v. Remeny, 355 N.E.2d 375,377 (N.Y. 1976) (holding that the anticommer· 
cia! handbill New York City ordinance originally applied and upheld in Valentine v. 
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), was invalid even as applied to purely commercial handbills). 
Three judges concurred in this view, one concurred only in the judgment, three dissented. Id.; 
see Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (opinion of Justice 
Douglas); supra note 21; cf. Robert C. Ellickson, Conrrolling Chronic Misconduct in Qry Spaces: Of 
Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1236 (1996) (footnote omit· 
ted): 
Like the maxims of equity, basic First Amendment doctrines tend to run in contradictory 
pairs. [One basic doctrine], for example, requires that speech restrictions be narrowly 
tailored to avoid the vice of "overbreadth." At the same time, another ... insists that 
speech regulation be content neutral, which often forces a government to regulate speech 
in larger swaths than it would otherwise prefer. 
31. Compare the following language from Discovery Network: 
In the absence of some basis for distinguishing berween "newspapers" and "commer· 
cia! handbills" that is relevant to an interest asserted by the city, we are unwilling to 
recognize Cincinnati's bare assertion that the "low value" of commercial speech is a 
sufficient justification for its selective ... ban on newsracks dispensing "commercial 
handbills." ... 
. . . [R)egardless of whether or not it leaves open ample alternative channels of 
communication [i.e., ample alternative channels of communication by means of which 
merchants can still reach consumers, and reach them in a reasonably cost-efficient way). 
City of Cincinatti v. Discovery Nerwork, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 428-30 (1993). Absent this asser· 
tive position by the Court, however, one might have supposed that the distinction drawn by the 
city may be "relevant" to an interest asserted by the city: Not the interest in aesthetics or con-
gestion, rather, its interest in not wanting to remove news racks providing a variety of news-
papers, such that it means to forego affecting an)' such newsracks, even if that does mean that 
such gain it can make (solely by ordering the removal of mere advertising newspapers) is 
less-even substantially less-than it might otherwise accomplish but for its concern to make no 
move trammeling the free press. See also discussion supra note 24. 
32. These are devices which employ a prerecorded message that automatically plays once 
the number that has been dialed "answers," the automatic dialing mechanism mechanically 
working its way through whatever series of telephone numbers it has been programmed to dial. 
33. Moser v. FCC, 826 F. Supp. 360 (D. Or. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 46 F.3d 970 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2615 (1995). 
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the use of these devices by a mass sales telemarketer is different in kind than 
when the same equipment is used by a candidate for public office, a grass· 
roots political group, or a nonprofit organization, whose use of the equip-
ment was not banned. Far from this difference in treatment being a virtue 
of the law (as one might surely have supposed), however, it was seen by the 
district court as a weakness, indeed, as a flaw sufficient to bring the act 
down on constitutional grounds. The court tracked the logic of the 
Discovery Network case and it sedulously recited the similarities of commer-
cial and noncommercial ADAD use: Both kinds of ADAD use "trigger the 
same ring ... and both risk interrupting the recipient's privacy equally."34 
Concluding from Discovery Network that the test that differential treatment 
of commercial and noncommercial speech is impermissible where the 
offending characteristics35 thought to make one suitable for regulation are 
equally shared by the other which the law nonetheless fails to treat in the 
same way, the court struck down the law as a form of impermissible content 
discrimination. 36 
Conversely, yet applying just the same logic, a federal court of appeals 
has upheld a state law which "neutrally" barred virtually any37 use of 
ADADs, including use of such a device by a person seeking election to 
public office who sought to use it merely in a manner he deemed helpful to 
advance his candidacy (namely, as he said, as "an inexpensive way to reach 
potential voters" and solely to "provide information" about himself and his 
campaign).38 The use of this calling device saved considerable expense 
over what would be required to use a "live" voice call, of course, which is 
why the plaintiff proceeded in this way, as he quite straightforwardly 
34. ld. at 366 (emphasis added). 
35. In this instance, the "offending characteristics" are (1) the uninvited ring of one's tele-
phone, and (2) the immediate "unanswerable" nature of the prerecorded message that is launched 
onto the recipient the moment the dialed connection is made. These characteristics are the 
same regardless of the message content, whether to alert one to a sale at Macy's or to ask that 
one vote for, or against, Proposition X. 
36. See also Moser v. Frohnmayer, 845 P.2d 1284 (Or. 1993). In reversing the district court 
in Moser 11. FCC, the Ninth Circuit did not disapprove of its rationale but instead noted that 
"the statute does not distinguish between commercial and noncommercial calls." 46 F.3d at 973. 
Rather, it merely permitted, but did not require, the FCC to do so. Finding that "the regula· 
tions" the FCC made were "outside the jurisdiction of the district court," it then described the 
"challenge to the statute's constitutionality" as a "narrow challenge," one that challenged the 
statute on its face. ld. Therefore, "[b]ecause the statute does not require that the FCC distin· 
guish between commercial and noncommercial calls, the appropriate inquiry is [merely] whether a 
ban on automated telemarketing calls is narrowly tailored to the residential privacy interest." 
The Ninth Circuit then determined that the ban was narrowly tailored to this end. ld. at 974. 
37. A few trivial exceptions were provided, e.g., for calls by schools needing to notify teach· 
ers that, due to weather conditions, classes were canceled. 
38. Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541, 1546 (8th Cir. 1995). 
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explained. Though the evidence the legislature had at the time this indis~ 
criminate ban was enacted in Minnesota consisted almost solely of objec~ 
tions from the high volume of ADAD use by commercial telemarketers, 
and though the court conceded that this was a relatively "new tech~ 
nology,"39 the court found nothing amiss in requiring candidates for public 
office to be relegated to the same means of reaching possible voters as a 
commercial corporation would have to use to flog its goods and services. ln 
respect to the banning of ADADs,· in brief, the court held it was constitu~ 
tional to have "leveled down" political speech to the same treatment as 
applied to commercial speech. 40 
These flattening~out developments are far more worthy of Procrustes41 
than James Madison. They have appeared during the same period in 
which, even more generally, the Supreme Court has effectively demoted 
opportunities for political speech as communicated in leaflets, posters, face~ 
t~face solicitation in public places, and other traditional, inexpensive grass 
roots ways of reaching wide audiences. Cases with doctrines similar to that 
found in Discovery Network appear to be but a part of a larger, increasingly 
intolerant, public forum "leveling down" trend. And they are all the more 
discouraging on that account, once put in this larger perspective as they 
need to be. 
As the case law stood no more than twenty years ago, I believe it 
would have been virtually a foregone conclusion, evident to even casual 
First Amendment students, that a city could not simply outlaw the 
election~enlivening common practice of tacking political posters to city 
utility poles for a few days just before a municipal election, as a traditional, 
cheap, and yet effective way of advancing one's preferred candidate for 
some state or local officeY Local politics have thrived on this hardy 
American tradition, subject only to a fair minimum of regulation and 
restraintY More recently, however, when the city council of Los Angeles 
39. Id. at 1556. 
40. Quoting from Discovery Network, the court treated the indiscriminate breadth of the ban 
(i.e., its indifference to the nature of the ADAD use, whether by mere commercial telemarketers 
or by others) as a "content neutral" virtue rather than as a First Amendment vice (the vice of 
overbreadth). Id. at 1550. 
41. "[A) fabulous Greek giant who stretched or shortened captives to fit one of his iron 
beds." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1044 (William 
Morris ed., 1971). 
42. Though there would also be little doubt that forbidding the posting of ordinary commer· 
cial sales flyers on such public property would raise no substantial First Amendment question at 
all. 
43. For instance, that care is taken to post such signs in ways posing no significant safery 
hazard and that one will also see to their prompt removal once the election is past. 
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flatly forbade all such postings (i.e. of any material at any time on city 
property), the Court, again in an opinion by Justice Stevens, sustained the 
ordinance even as applied in this manner to local candidate posters, despite 
the federal court of appeals view that as applied it was irreconcilable with 
the more ample protection of free political speech as previously declared by 
the Supreme Court. 1t was enough for the Supreme Court, however, that 
these uses of such signs on public property (e.g., utility poles along the 
public streets) were now thought to contribute to "the substantive evil" of 
"visual blight" such that the city could now ban them on that account not 
just for commercial uses (postings advertising ordinary consumer goods), but 
for these traditional, local, core political uses as well.44 
Likewise, the Court has recently upheld federal postal regulations 
forbidding any soliciting on the perimeter sidewalk of United States Post 
Offices. The Court rejected a forceful argument that such a broad restric· 
tion unfairly trammels the opportunity of small advocacy groups who lack 
means to seek support for their various causes by more expensive forms of 
appeal to use these sidewalk locations to reach those willing to pause to 
hear them out, if they choose. 45 ln upholding the regulation, the Court 
reversed the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which had concluded that 
such a ban, not limited in any way merely to ordinary commercial solicita· 
tions, could not be sustained consistent with the Supreme Court's previous 
statements and emphasis on the special requirements of openness for politi· 
cal speech. 46 But the Supreme Court held otherwise-as though in antici· 
pation of its new attitude ("one rule fits all") in the Discovery Netwark caseY 
44. See City O:>Uncil v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984); see also Burson v. 
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) {likewise sustaining a 100-foot "campaign-free zone" at polls to 
forbid any distribution of election materials within that radius, cutting off a traditional low-cost 
means to reach voters with simple handbills seeking support for some local candidate or slate of 
candidates). For a contrast with Vincent and Burson, see City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038 
(1994) (holding that posting political signs on one's property cannot be banned). 
45. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990) (5-4 decision); see also United States 
Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114 (1981) (sustaining a flat ban on placing 
anything in anyone's mailbox other than material that the postal service itself delivers, whether 
or not the box owner would have no objection and would willingly receive such material). 
46. See the compelling opinion by Judge Harvie Wilkinson for the court of appeals in 
Kokinda, 866 F.2d at 699. 
47. See also 1ntemationalSoc'y for Krishna Consciousness, lnc. v. Lee, 506 U.S. 805 (1992) 
(5-4 decision) (holding entire interiors of Kennedy, La Guardia, and Newark International airports 
"nonpublic" forums to which the least demanding First Amendment time, place, and manner test 
will apply, and thus holding that political or religious soliciting may be as readily forbidden as 
commercial soliciting). Relatedly, see Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (withdrawing the 
availability of any part of even the largest corporately held shopping malls, including parking 
areas and public walkway areas, from First Amendment reach, and explaining that Lloyd Corp. v. 
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), implicitly overruled Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan 
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In "leveling up" commercial speech in the new Discovery Network 
sense, 48 the Court has done less leveling up than leveling down. 49 For 
an increasing number of limitations that may make reasonable sense in 
restraining commercial vendors now tend to be sustained even if (and some, 
times, according to Discovery Network, only if) applied "equally" to political 
and social advocacy uses as well. 
PART N: REMEMBERING MELVILLE NIMMER 
The field of copyright law·, Melville Nimmer's field, may seem far 
removed from what we have been considering here, but in fact, it is not. 
For the field of copyright law is in large measure itself merely a highly 
specialized segment of "commercial speech." The use of one's copyright 
power often involves the mere selling of one's speech, and often a very 
crass selling it can be. Even so, pursuant to an explicit, enumerated 
power,50 Congress vests in an "author" a monopoly control over other 
people's use of something the "author" may have fixed in some form-such 
Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968)). See generaUy Keith Werhan, The Supreme Court's Public 
Forum Doctrine and the Return of Formalism, 7 CARDOZO L. REv. 335 (1986). 
48. I.e., that where the characteristics producing negative externalities are common to 
commercial and noncommercial matter indistinguishably, the former may not be restricted in 
ways from which the latter are exempt when the former contributes no more substantially to the 
same problem and, indeed, may contribute to that problem even less. 
49. A different kind of additional example of "leveling down" may be furnished by Forsyth 
County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992). The Court originally granted certiorari 
in Forsyth County to resolve the question of the extent to which government could impose fee 
charges for those assembling or parading in public places. Id. at 129. The court of appeals had 
held that no more than a "nominal" charge could be required, at least in respect to traditional 
political assemblies and demonstrative, social-advocacy assemblies or parades. Id. at 128-29. In 
the Supreme Court, the case technically washed out, since the majority found the ordinance 
defective in committing a standardless discretion to the administrator to charge less than full 
direct cost up to $1,000 per day. Id. at 132-33. Nevertheless, as four dissenting Justices noted, 
the case left the implication that the government's insistence on coverage of such costs, objec-
tively determined and neutrally required of every party, would be sustained. Id. at 140-41 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Already the case has been understood in this way. See, e.g., Long 
Beach Lesbian & Gay Pride, Inc. v. City of Long Beach, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 861 (1993). Under 
this view, whether it were a commercial, promotional parade sponsored by local merchants, or 
that of an ad hoc minority political protest group, those unable to defray all direct city costs 
associated with the event may simply be out of luck. If this is to be so, however, note how the 
conflation of commercial and noncommercial uses of the public parks and streets thus tends to 
become even more rigid and complete. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Celebrating Selma: The 
Importance of Context in Public Forum Analysis, 104 YALE L.J. 1411 (1995); Eric Neisser, Charging 
for Free Speech: User Fees and Insurance in the Marketplace of Ideas, 74 GEO. L.J. 257 (1985). 
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."). 
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"speech" (in a loose sense) as originated with him. The author is thereby 
empowered to exploit that monopoly as he pleases, to forbid anyone to 
reproduce the copyrighted material other than as he wishes, on terms satis-
factory to himself. ln brief, the Copyright Act carves a wide swath of 
"delegated censorship power" the State (in this instance, Congress, pursu-
ant to the copyright clause) entrusts to "authors,"51 thus to limit freedom 
of speech. 
Mel Nimmer was, first of all, a great copyright lawyer, even before he 
became a valued member of the UCLA law faculty in 1962. And as a 
copyright lawyer, he frequently represented parties to enforce their copy-
right claims, assisting them to suppress unlicensed, unauthorized excerpting, 
quoting, borrowed renderings, and even remote "derivative"52 byproducts 
without such payment as his clients demanded (if at all). lt was, in short, 
from an objective point of view, a substantial part of Nimmer's practice to 
serve business interests ("commercial" interests of large companies), to put 
to their service his expertise in copyright-to "interfere," if you will, with 
the freedom of others to repeat what his clients did not want repeated, did 
not want played, performed, or merely "copied," save on such terms as the 
law vested in his clients an exclusive right to command. 53 
51. The power thus wielded need not actually be an author's power-it is enough to be the 
copyright holder (e.g., a corporate assignee). For critical reflection on the divorce of copyright 
from original authors to corporate assignees, see the observations made fifty years ago of 
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the LAw of Copyright (pt. 1), 45 COLUM. L. REv. 503, 719 
(1945). 
52. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994) ("[T]he owner of copyright ... has the exclusive rights 
to ... prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work .... "). 
53. It is worth noting that currently the monopoly control of a copyright-holder extends 
through the entire life of the original author (in the case of jointly authored works, the life of the 
longest-surviving author), plus a half-century beyond that. 17 U.S.C. § 30Z(a)-(b) (1994). This 
government-granted authority to control exclusive publication rights may therefore easily last 
through an entire century. See, e.g., id. § 30Z(e) (stating the presumption that the copyright has 
expired "one hundred years" from date the work was created, when date of author's death is 
unknown). This protection may well endure even longer, however. For example, in the case of 
an author who writes something at age 18 and lives to 93, the copyright will run for 125 years (75 
years from the date the work was "fixed" in a tangible medium plus another half-century). 
Query, however, whether such an extended period can be fairly rationalized merely in order that 
creativity be furnished appropriate incentive. How long is such a power to control other people's 
access and use appropriate, after all? Is it pertinent to that question to note that prior to the 
current Act (1976), the maximum period for such censorship control over other people's uses of 
the work was less than half the century-and-quarter time possible today (56 years under the 1909 
Act, and only then if care were taken to renew the original 28-year registration)? Is it useful to 
realize that under the original Copyright Act of 1790, moreover, the period was far shorter 
still-14 years, once renewable (so, a total of not more than 28 years)? See Act of May 31, 1790, 
1 Stat. 124, reprinted in 5 DAVID NIMMER & MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGI-IT: A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LITERARY, MUSICAL AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY, AND THE PROTEC. 
TJON OF IDEAS, app. at 7·41 to -44 (1995). 
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Given that background, one might suppose that Mel Nimmer would 
rejoice in the development of ever enlarging the entitlements of "commer-
cial speech" doctrines of the sort we have been reviewing; extending their 
reach and securing their claims across a widening frontier. But in fact that 
is not the way things were. Rather, it was the case that Nimmer's deep 
experience in the trenches of copyright law54 put him in a better position 
than others-including a large number of First Amendment experts-to see 
how all speech cannot, ought not, by any means, be treated as constitu· 
tionally the same. 
Even the purpose of the Copyright Clause and of copyright itself, he 
understood, was not to promote "commerce" as such but to serve First 
Amendment interests in a certain way. To do so, as conveyed on the face 
of the Copyright Clause, by granting a limited power to Congress to "pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts," by furnishing a fair assurance 
that creativity, transformative expression, original images-different ways of 
seeing old things as well as new expressions of new things-would be 
encouraged, albeit encouraged by a nominal First Amendment ("anti-free 
speech") paradox of vesting in the author-the one who would do any of 
The original Copyright Act was adopted the year following Congress's approval of the First 
Amendment (1789), so one may suppose that the original 28-year period would raise no First 
Amendment complaint. May the same still be said, however, though the period is now more 
than a century? To be sure, in an early case, Pennock&. Sellers v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 
16-17 (1829), Justice Story thought the determination of the length of the "limited period" for 
copyright and patent protection a matter "subject to the discretion of Congress." But Story went 
on to say: 
While one great object was, by holding out a reasonable reward to inventors ... to 
stimulate the efforts of genius; the main object was "to promote the progress of science 
and useful arts;" and this could be done best, by gi11ing the public at large a right to make, 
consiTUct, use, and 11end the thing in11ented, at as early a period as possible •••• 
ld. at 19 (emphasis added); see also Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of 
Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 284, 350 (1970) 
(examining the proposal then before Congress to extend copyright duration from the maximum of 
56 years to the life of the author plus 50 years, and concluding that the then current period was 
itself already "too long" and that no adequate case for the proposed longer period of protection 
had been made); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1197 
(1996). And consider Thomas Macauley, Speech Delivered in the House of Commons (Feb. 5, 
1841), in 8 THE WORKS OF loRD MACAULEY 201 (London, logmas, Green&. Co. 1879) ("The 
principle of copyright is this. It is a tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers. 
The tax is an exceedingly bad one; it is a tax on one of the most innocent and most salutary of 
human pleasures .... "). 
54. Coincidentally (or, rather, probably not coincidentally), one of the great seminal aca· 
demic contributors to First Amendment theory prior to Mel Nimmer, Professor Zechariah Chafee 
was likewise an expert on copyright law. See, e.g., ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, }R., FREE SPEECH IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1942); Chafee, supra note 51, at 719. 
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these original, creative things-a limited power to disallow others to broad-
cast it to the public without his consent. 55 
But copyright itself also drew lines, specifically distinguishing by "con· 
tent," the most basic of these lines requiring that the expression seeking 
copyright protection must be original and nontrivially creative to qualify, 
i.e., not so obvious that creativity would play a de minimis role. Even if 
effort is involved, if creativity is not, then the special protection of the 
Copyright Act simply does not apply.56 Additionally, the Copyright Act, 
55. See the observations by Justice Story supra note 53; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 
271-72 Oames Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). To be sure, it may be a nice question 
whether copyright protection or its lack would make the world better informed and richer-if, for 
example, the instant a new play were published, an untrammeled freedom of everyone at once to 
copy and make whatever use of that copy each might like to do, albeit without consent of the 
author, were the law. The Constitution resolved that question in favor of copyright theory (to 
encourage authors, and so by their encouragement, secure creative works for the public good), but 
even so, only up to point-by vesting a qualified copyright power in Congress and nothing more. 
Consider also the strikingly similar question recently presented in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 
501 U.S. 663 (1991). In Cowles Media, the Court acknowledged that the threatened enforcement 
of a reporter's promise of source confidentiality to one providing information and seeking to keep 
his name from being used may operate to keep the public ignorant of highly salient facts the 
newspaper's senior editors subsequently decide are themselves an important part of the story the 
newspaper ought to report. ld. at 671-72. The public is thus deprived of information the editors 
themselves concluded was information the public deserved to know. Yet, though that is true, it 
is also true that insofar as such promises are binding (and therefore must be kept to avoid suits for 
damages), the assurance that such promises are binding may well encourage knowledgeable 
persons to be more forthcoming when they would not otherwise be willing so to do. Thus the 
public interest in the information they have, and would not otherwise part with, will be 
advanced. It thus was equally a very nice question in Cowles Media which rule (enforceability or 
nonenforceability of reporters' promises of source confidentiality) would be the more "speech 
enhancing" rule helpful to the public-informing value of a free press. A majority concluded that 
a state could decide on either course. ld. at 672. For a thoughtful review of the problem, see Lili 
Levi, Dangerous Liaisons: Seduction and Betrayal in Confidential Press-Source Relations, 43 RlJfGERS 
L. REV. 609 (1991). And for a useful comment following the Court's decision, see The Supreme 
Court, 1990 Tenn-Leading Cases, 105 HARv. L REv. 177, 277-79 (1991). 
56. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). As David 
Nimmer usefully describes the case: 
[In Feist] the Supreme Court ... construed the limitation in the Copyright Clause that 
Congress could only protect the "Writings" of "Authors." The Court concluded unani-
mously that only something creative, evincing intellectual effort, qualifies as the 
"Writings" of "Authors" under the Constitution. On that basis, the decision ruled that 
telephone book white pages stand outside constitutional protection. 
David Nimmer, The End of Copyright, 48 VANO. L. REv. 1385, 1413 (1995) (footnotes omitted); 
see also Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (the "creativity" 
elements are enormously strained in Geis); cf. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1879) 
(holding that an act of Congress providing for registration of trademarks and criminal penalties 
for infringers is not within Congress's power under the "authors and inventors" clause and that a 
trademark need involve neither originality nor creativity, but merely "priority of appropriation" 
and "a considerable period of use. j. The Court added: "[W]e are unable to see any such power 
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as Mel Nimmer understood acutely, has its own built-in consciousness of 
the First Amendment, most prominently in the exempting provisions for 
"fair use. "57 The fair use exemption, itself, makes distinctions that are not 
at all "content neutral." For example, if one quotes at length without the 
copyright holder's permission, and indeed without having offered to pay for 
the use at all-but embeds the passage inside a review (even one so devastat· 
ing as to destroy the market for the work being reviewed), the use falls 
within the exemption. This is so because the unlicensed use in question 
lets the reader see just what it is, concretely, the critic is commending or 
criticizing; it is a protected free use; it is a so-called "fair" use. And this is 
so, of course, although the same passage reproduced in a commercial work 
of "Memorable Excerpts," a work containing merely the very same excerpts, 
with others of equivalent length from still other authors would not qualify 
as "fair use" under the law.58 Even far more than the "limited times" 
restriction59 and the creative originalitfO requirement of the Copyright 
Clause, the fair use provisions of the Copyright Act report a keen balance 
of First Amendment concerns. 61 
in the constitutional provision concerning authors and inventors, and their writings and 
discoveries." Id. 
Regrettably, this significant limitation on the copyright power has been eviscerated. 
What Congress lacks power to do pursuant to the Copyright Clause, it has been permitted none• 
theless to do pursuant to the Commerce Clause (despite the original decision to the contrary l,n 
the Trade-Mark Cases) and pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause to carry into domestic 
law obligations negotiated by the President in making treaties with other nation-states. See 
Nimmer, supra, at 1408-20. 
57. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994): 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted 
work ... for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including 
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of 
copyright. In determining whether the use ... is a fair use the factors to be considered 
shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial 
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work 
as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
58. Did the content of the unauthorized copied passages fit within the imperatives of a 
critical review, or was it taken merely to appear within a commercialized collection of "Memor• 
able Excerpts," would be the question to be answered in court. See supra note 57 (setting out the 
various fair use factors). 
59. See description and critical discussion supra note 53. 
60. See supra text accompanying note 52. 
61. For a recent and highly compelling example, see Campbell v. Acuff·Rose Music, 1nc., 
114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994) (Souter, J., for a unanimous Court) (holding that even substantial borrow· 
ing of readily recognizable portions of copyrighted song (Roy Orbison's Pretty Woman) in a strong, 
rap social parody version, may constitute a fair use). The opinion in Acuff·Rose resonates with 
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For Mel, moreover, as of the time he was most actively practicing 
copyright law, it was by no means clear that the fair use exemption in the 
Copyright Act would extend as far as it should in order to provide adequate 
allowance for certain unauthorized uses critical to the informing function of 
a free press. So much worse for the Act-for Mel had no doubt that the 
First Amendment might itself be used as a suitable shield in an appropriate 
case to block any successful infringement claim under the Act.62 
First Amendment, social satire, social parody, and anti-establishment freedom of speech concerns. 
See, for example, the following language: 
2 Live Crew juxtaposes the romantic musings of a man whose fantasy comes true [the 
theme of the Roy Orbison original), with degrading taunts, a bawdy demand for sex, and 
a sigh of relief from paternal responsibility. The later words [in the 2 Live Crew version) 
can be taken as a comment on the naivete of the original of an earlier day, as a rejection 
of its sentiment that ignores the ugliness of street life and the debasement that it signi· 
fies .... 
. . . [W]hen a lethal parody, like a scathing theater review, kills demand for the 
original, it does not produce a harm cognizable under the Copyright Act. 
114 S. Ct. at 1173, 1178. What has happened, incidental to the Acuff·Rose case, is that the "fair 
use" factors of the Copyright Act have been interpreted to co-opt First Amendment arguments. 
In other words, the case strongly suggests that whatever the First Amendment might itself require 
to be deemed exempt from the reach of a copyright infringement action will be deemed protected 
within the Act as an exempted fair use. Cf. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 
(1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., for a· unanimous Court) (holding that a parody ad, rife with political 
caricature, is protected by the First Amendment from state tort claims for misappropriation, libel, 
or intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
And note also the postscript litigation to HustleT Magazine. After Hustler published its scurri· 
lous ad parody maligning Falwell with crude gusto, Falwell sought to appeal to his own supporters 
by reproducing more than 750,000 copies of the Hustler parody advertisement to show how he 
had been treated, as part of a solicitation drive. Hustler Magazine promptly filed suit for copy· 
right infringement (namely, the mass copying and mass distribution, for fund-raising purpo~es, of 
Hustler's original ad copy, without its consent). But there was a nice justice done-Hustler's 
infringement action was dismissed on a motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals 
affirmed, concluding that the use made by Falwell, given the ciTcumstances (to answer the attack on 
his integrity as a public figure by Flynt and Hustler), was a "fair use" within the Copyright Act. 
See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986). One may well 
say that First Amendment interests were well served, all around. Both Acuff-Rose and HustleT 
Magazine make liberal reference to the Nimmer treatise, attesting to its continuing stature, a 
stature well-maintained by David Nimmer. 
62. In his entry on copyright in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN C0NSTI11JTION 
504-05 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986), Nimmer went out of his way to remind the general 
reader that the power vested in Congress pursuant to the Copyright Clause was as much subject 
to the First Amendment as any other power vested in Congress in Article l. He observed that 
"[i)n recent years the courts have begun to question whether, and to what extent, the copyright 
laws are subject to ... the First Amendment." ld. at 505. He emphatically agreed that they 
were fully subject to the First Amendment, reminding the reader of the following: 
Nothing in the First Amendment limits the freedom protected thereunder to speech that 
is original with the speaker. Nor does the fact that the Constitution also grants to 
Congress the power to enact copyright laws render the First Amendment inapplicable [to 
laws Congress adopts pursuant to that clause]. The First Amendment and the remainder 
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Generally, Mel had noted, the factors involving fair use as permitted by the 
Copyright Act63 were restricted to uses that do not "materially impair the 
marketability of the work that is copied. "64 Even if there were such a 
material impairment, however, he had no doubt that "[t]he First Amend, 
ment privilege, when appropriate, may be invoked, despite the fact that the 
marketability of the copied work is thereby impaired. "65 And he main, 
tained that view, very strongly, through the end of his distinguished 
career.66 
But Nimmer's mastery of copyright also gave him one other advantage 
well worth noting here, as we seek to draw these notes to some useful close. 
I d. 
of the Bill of Rights limit only those powers that have otherwise been confided to the 
federal government. If it did not modify such powers, it would have no meaning at all. 
63. See supra note 57 (listing the fair use factors). 
64. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 53, § 1.10[0), at 1-92 (footnote omitted). 
65. Id. As a concrete example of when it would be "appropriate" to fall back onto the First 
Amendment, rather than to rely on the fair use provision, he offered the district court opinion in 
Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). First, he faulted the court 
in Geis insofar as it had held that the copying for commercial use by Ufe magazine of the 
Zapruder film (the footage showing the shooting of President Kennedy in Dallas) without the 
copyright holder's consent was a "fair" use within the terms of the act. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, 
supra note 53, § 1.10[0), at 1-93. Rather, Mel believed, where, as in Geis, the entirety of the 
copyrighted picture was appropriated without permission for use by a commercial publication, the 
case could not fairly be reasoned within the statute (i.e., it strained the terms of the statute too 
much). Id. Nevertheless, in his view, the decision was defensible-but it should have been based 
on First Amendment grounds. Id. In dicta, a federal district court subsequently expressed agree-
ment with Mel's First Amendment review of Geis. Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 572 F. Supp. 
1186, 1193 n.5 (N.D. Ga. 1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 744 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985) ("In Time[] Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, the court found the 
unauthorized use of the Zapruder film to be fair use. Professor Nimmer believes the case more 
soundly rests on a First Amendment rationale. This Court agrees." (citations omitted)); see also 
Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970); Melville B. 
Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 
UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970); Lyman R. Patterson, Private Copyright and Public Communication: 
Free Speech Endangered, 28 VAND. L. REV. 1161 (1975). Compare Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard 
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (holding that a commercial airing of Zacchini's human 
cannonball act over his objection was actionable pursuant to state common law claim for com· 
mercial misappropriation) with Geis, 293 F. Supp. at 130 (involving no similar events of public 
interest). 
66. See, for example, his amicus brief in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 
471 U.S. 539 (1985) (defending Nation's unauthorized. use of 300 words of Gerald Ford's discus-
sion of why he pardoned President Nixon, upstaging the planned publication of the same 
material by Time magazine under exclusive first serial publication rights from Harper & Row). 
The Court, divided six-to-three, however, upheld the infringement claim. Id. at 569. The case 
and Nimmer's participation in it, his last professional submission before his death, are elaborately 
reviewed in 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 53,§ 1.10, at 1-71, 1-82 to -83; 3 id. § 13.05, at 
13·194 to -205. See also RODNEY SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A 
TREATISE ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT§ 12.05, at 12-113 to -118 (1994). 
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Copyright makes a fundamental distinction between an idea as such and 
different expressions of an idea. The basic notion is that an idea is never 
subject to copyright;67 rather, copyright attaches to one's personalized 
representation of the idea, the concatenation of words, the way this or that 
author has differently captured it and turned it loose again. lt is thus quite 
natural for a copyright lawyer to insist, as Nimmer insisted, that "[i]n the 
exposition of ideas[,] form and substance are inextricably merged. "68 It is, 
after all, just this "inextricability" of the new (the form) reformulating the 
old (the subsisting idea) that offers itself as a competing perspective, so to 
tutor others to see something they did not see as well until this iteration 
appeared. 
What distinguished Mel Nimmer was not that he understood this 
staple, or mere commonplace, of copyright. What distinguished him, 
rather, was that he readily saw its connection to "democratic dialogue"69 
in a far more spacious, generous, and libertarian sense. His wider grasp of 
First Amendment principles enabled him to carry the connection between 
form and substance into a larger, wholehearted defense of freedom of 
speech at large in American life. He knew how and why protecting the 
right to express oneself differently mattered beyond copyright. And he put 
his understanding to its most effective use before the Supreme Court in 
1971, in Cohen v. California, 70 producing one of the strongest defenses to 
have come from the Court on the protection of political freedom of 
speech.71 
Cohen v. California was not a copyright case nor in any sense a case 
about commercial speech. A mere local misdemeanor case, it arose from 
the arrest of a young man (Paul Cohen) for disturbing the peace by display# 
ing "Fuck the Draft" on his jacket in the heavily trafficked public corridors 
of the Los Angeles County Courthouse where, as the trial court had noted, 
"women and children were present. "72 Relying on a three#decade#old case 
in which the Court had broadly implied that the use of mere four#letter 
67. The Act is quite clear that no idea, as such, is subject to copyright. See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 102(b) (1994) ("In no case does copyright protection ... extend to any idea .... "). 
68. Brieffor Appellant at 34, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (No. 299). 
69. ld. 
70. 403 u.s. 15 (1971). 
71. The Justices currently inclined to collapse the public forum might profit themselves by 
re-reading this case and by taking its essential points more to heart than seems to be reflected in 
some of the principal cases we have reviewed. 
72. OJhen, 403 U.S. at 16. 
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expletives in public places need not be tolerated by public authority,73 
three Justices were strongly inclined to dismiss Cohen's First Amendment 
claim. As they saw it, Cohen's behavior was little more than an "absurd 
and immature antic . . . mainly conduct and little speech. "74 For them, 
his case, therefore, provided no suitable occasion for "agonizing over First 
Amendment values"75 at all. For the majority, however, in perhaps his 
most compelling opinion during his sixteen years on t,he Supreme Court, 
Justice Harlan saw the matter quite differently. And behind that opinion 
rested Nimmer's strong brief and oral argument. Professor Nimmer's brief 
in the Supreme Court and his compelling oral argument moved Cohen's 
case from the margins to the center of First Amendment concern. 
ln his brief, Nimmer argued strongly against the Court's earlier, tenta~ 
tive dismissal of certain "well known classes of utterances" as generally 
beneath First Amendment notice. There were no such classes, he sug~ 
gested, nor could there be, without damaging the First Amendment itself. 
ln this very case, for example, granted that Cohen's use of a four letter 
expletive was crude, what substitution might one make under the circum~ 
stances, without compromising meaning and message alike? Blunt language 
informs in ways conventional expression masquerades and frequently fails to 
capture at all. "The emotive content of language," Nimmer suggested, 
"can be fully as important as its intellectual content." Nor, he added, may 
the state "require that dissenting views be expressed in a manner that the 
authorities regard as polite. "76 Nearing the close of his oral argument, 
Nimmer returned to his point, "[W]e respectfully submit," he suggested, 
that "offensiveness of form, no less than the offensiveness of substance, 
must be preserved by the First Amendment, if the First Amendment is to 
be meaningful. "77 And scarcely four months later, picking up from 
Nimmer's own phrasing, Justice Harlan proceeded toward the Court's own 
73. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 511-12 (1942) ("There are certain 
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which 
have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem .... It has been well observed that 
such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value 
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the 
social interest in order and morality." (foomotes omitted)). 
74. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Black, J., & Burger, C.J.). 
75. ld. 
76. Brief for Appellant at 33, 34, Cohen (No. 299). 
77. Oral argument of Melville B. Nimmer on Behalf of Appellate, reprinted in 70 LAND-
MARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITU• 
TIONAL LAW 838 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975). The point has generally 
been accepted by the Court since Cohen. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 414 
(1992) (White, J., concurring) ("[11hat expressive activity causes hurt feelings, offense, or resent· 
ment does not render the expression unprotected." (citing Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20)). 
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compelling conclusion embracing the point virtually without reservation in 
the following manner: 
[W]ords are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cogni· 
tive force. We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, 
while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has 
little or no regard for that emotive function which, practically speak· 
ing, may often be the more important element of the overall message 
sought to be communicated. 78 
Harlan explained: 
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a 
society as diverse and populous as ours. lt is designed and intended 
to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discus· 
sion .... 
To many, the immediate consequence of this freedom may often 
appear to be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utter· 
ance. These are, however, within established limits, in truth neces· 
sary side effects of the broader enduring values which the process of 
open debate permits us to achieve. That the air may at times seem 
filled with verbal cacophony is, in this sense not a sign of weakness 
but of strength. 79 
By any measure, Cohen was a distinctly "American" freedom of speech 
case-strong, uncompromised, committed to a risk-taking (rather than a 
risk-averse) First Amendment, confident in the end as against the more 
collapsed and constrained regimes in countries with weaker first amend· 
ments than ours. The opinion exhibits a confidence in central principles of 
free speech and of a free press Mel Nimmer cherished and nourished 
through his own example and his distinguished career. We may wish that 
the Court should do as well as he in seeing where those central principles 
are strongly implicated in the cases that come before it, as well as when 
they are not. 
78. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26. 
79. Id. at 24-25. 
